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ABSTRACT
Large-scale cascading failures can be triggered by very few initial failures, leading to
severe damages in complex networks. As modern society becomes more and more net-
worked, there is an increasing requirement of security and reliability of complex networks
such as infrastructure networks and cyber networks. In order to design networks which are
robust to attacks and enhance the security of the existing networks, this paper studies load-
dependent cascading failures in random networks consisting of a large but finite number
of components. Under a random single-node attack, a framework is developed to quan-
tify the damage at each stage of a cascade. We mainly use probability theory to analyze
the cascade process and use simulations to verify our conclusion. In our result, estima-
tions for the fraction of failed nodes are presented to evaluate the time-dependent system
damage due to the attack. Furthermore, the analysis reveals a phase transition behavior in
the extent of the damage as the load margin grows. That is, the fraction of the damaged
components drops from near one to near zero over a slight change in the load margin. The
critical value of the load margin and the short interval over which such an abrupt change
occurs are derived to characterize the network reaction to small network load variations.
Our findings provide design principles for enhancing the network resiliency and provide
guidelines for choosing the load margin to avoid a cascade of failures in load-dependent
complex networks with practical sizes.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As modern society becomes more and more networked, there is an increasing require-
ment of security and reliability in complex networks such as telecommunication systems
and the Internet. A wide-spread cascading failure is a serious threat to such systems [1,19].
Starting with a small disturbance, cascading failures may lead to a complete or major net-
work collapse. Despite an extensive effort to study the properties of cascading failures in
complex networks, this field is still under-explored, especially for the cases of finite-size
networks. Thus, it is crucial to investigate the properties of cascading failures for such
cases to improve the operation security and reliability.
In many real-life networks such as transportation networks and communication net-
works, each node bears some load, which can be redistributed locally to its neighbors. The
loads of the nodes can be a particular material or abstract information [12]. In normal con-
ditions, each node maintains a load below its capacity. When some initial failures occur
(due to attacks or internal failures), the failed nodes are removed, and their loads will be
redistributed to their neighbors. If the neighbors then become overloaded, they will fail
too, and their loads will be redistributed further. Such a process may lead to a cascading
failure.
Many researchers have studied this area from different aspects and found valuable re-
sults. From a graph model perspective [7], Motter and Lai [13], and Crucitti et al. [2, 8]
both adopted betweenness [8, 16] to model the load on a component. In [13], Motter and
Lai found that heterogeneous topologies are more vulnerable to attacks. In [8] and [2],
the authors used Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs to study the networks where the load of each
Reprinted from [11] “Load-Dependent Cascading Failures in Finite-Size Erdo¨s-Re´nyi Random Net-
works” by D. Lv and A. Eslami and S. Cui, 2017, Network Science and Engineering, IEEE Trans on (TNSE),
Volume 4, Page 129-139. Copyright 2017 by IEEE.
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node is proportional to its betweenness. They showed that in such models an intended
attack on the most heavily loaded node can collapse the entire network. Load-dependent
cascades have been studied in [3,17,18]. In [3], the authors considered a network of iden-
tical nodes and applied a Poisson branching process to study cascading failures. In [17]
and [18], Wang and Rong assumed that both initially-assigned load and redistributed load
are proportional to the node’s degree. They concluded that in such a setting, an attack on
the most heavily loaded node might not always be the most destructive one. The major-
ity of the existing analytical work focuses on cascading failures in asymptotically large
networks. However, finite-size networks are of paramount importance in both theoretical
analysis and real life. For such networks, the analytical approach has been mostly over-
looked (mainly due to technical difficulties), limiting the results to only simulations [2,8].
In this paper, we develop a framework to study cascading failures in a network rep-
resented by a finite-size Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) random graph [4, 6]. In such a network, each
node carries a certain amount of load, and maintains a load margin up to which it can tol-
erate some extra load. If a node becomes overloaded, it fails and its load is redistributed to
its neighbors. We adopt the ER random graph as the topology model since such model is
homogeneous by construction, and it has the advantage of being mathematically tractable
given many important properties [15]. While the ER random graph itself is a basic model,
many of its variants with non-Poisson distributions are used to model some real-world net-
works, such as the Internet and collaboration graphs [14, 15]. A thorough understanding
of such complicated networks requires a strong knowledge of the fundamental ER model.
Furthermore, we focus on random single-node attacks and study the propagation of
failures. We assume that the initial load at each node is proportional to its degree, which
is also a fraction of its capacity, leaving some load margin. Inspired by the nature of
load shifting in many real networks such as the transportation network [2,10,13], the load
redistribution upon failure is assumed to be in proportion to the neighbors’ capacities. This
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paper proposes several novel approaches to quantitatively analyze such cascade model. For
example, we partition the overall node set into several subsets according to their potential
failing time. In the proposed framework, the main contributions of this paper are:
 Step-by-step analysis of damages at each stage of a potential cascade: To quantify
the severity of a cascade, we use the fraction of failed nodes, which we denote as
failure ratio. We provide a method to calculate the failure ratio at each step of the
potential cascade. We also estimate the time when the cascade reaches a steady
state. Our results provide insights into choosing the right value of the load margin
such that a cascade of failures can be avoided.
 Threshold behavior of the collateral damage: Numerical results show that the fail-
ure ratio drops from near 1 to near 0 over a very short interval of the load margin.
We find the interval within which such phase transition occurs and derive the crit-
ical value of the load margin at which the abrupt change of the failure ratio takes
place. The phase transition interval along with the critical value of the load margin
characterizes the network reaction to a random single-node attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the system model
and defines the notations. A step-by-step analysis of the average failure ratio is provided
in Section 3. The phase transition in the average failure ratio is explored in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
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2. LOAD-BASED CASCADE MODEL
In this section, we describe our model of the load-based cascading failure. We also
discuss the topology and attack models. Table 2.1 lists all the notations used in this paper.
2.1 Topology Model
Consider an ER random graph G(n; p), where the graph has n nodes and every two
nodes are connected with probability p independent of the other pairs [6]. The overall
node set is denoted as V . During each step t of a cascade (rigorously defined later), some
nodes are failed (dead), and some are still functioning (alive). For any node v 2 V ,
we use Nt(v) to denote the set of functioning neighbors of v at the beginning of step t.
Particularly, N0(v) represents the initial neighbor set of v before any failures. The degree
of node v, denoted by k(v), is the number of initial neighbors of v, i.e., k(v) = jN0(v)j,
where j  j is the cardinality of a set. Each node v has a load Lt(v) at the beginning of step
t. We assume that the initial load of each node is proportional to its degree [17, 20]. To
simplify the analysis, we set the proportion scaling factor as 1, such that L0(v) = k(v).
Each node v has a time-invariant capacity C(v), which is the maximum load that it can
handle. Furthermore, C(v) is assumed to be proportional to L0(v), i.e.,
C(v) = L0(v) = k(v); (2.1)
where   1 is the tolerance parameter (load margin) of the network, the same across all
the nodes. A node will fail if the load exceeds its capacity.
Reprinted from [11] “Load-Dependent Cascading Failures in Finite-Size Erdo¨s-Re´nyi Random Net-
works” by D. Lv and A. Eslami and S. Cui, 2017, Network Science and Engineering, IEEE Trans on (TNSE),
Volume 4, Page 129-139. Copyright 2017 by IEEE.
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Table 2.1: List of Notations. Reprinted from [11].
Notation Description
G(n; p) ER random graph with n nodes and
connectivity probability p
V Set of all nodes
j  j Cardinality of a set
k() Initial degree
Nt() Functioning neighbor set at the be-
ginning of step t
Lt() Load at the beginning of step t
 Tolerance parameter
C() Capacity
Lt(v; u) Redistributed load from node v to
node u at step t
a Initially attacked node
Vd Set of nodes whose shortest dis-
tance from the initially attacked
node is d
V^t Set of target nodes at step t
Ft Set of failed nodes during step t
Tt Set of all failed nodes by the end of
step t
ft Failure ratio by the end of step t
 Conditional mean of k(V1) given
jV1j
2 Conditional variance of k(V1) given
jV1j
^ Conditional mean of L0(V^t) given
jV^tj
^2 Conditional variance of L0(V^t)
given jV^tj
~ Conditional mean ofLt(Ft 1) given
jV^tj
~2 Conditional variance of Lt(Ft 1)
given jV^tj
c;t Critical value of  at step t
[l;t; h;t] Threshold interval of  at step t
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2.2 Attack and Contagion Models
In this paper, we focus on the case of a random single-node attack, where the initially
attacked node is a single randomly chosen node in the network. After the initial attack, we
divide the overall cascade process into time slots called steps. During each step, the latest
failed nodes redistribute their loads to their functioning neighbors. If any of the neighbors
fail, they will redistribute their loads at the next step. The load redistribution mechanism is
described as follows. Assume that node a is attacked initially (during step t = 0) and fails.
Then at step t = 1, the neighbors of a, i.e., nodes inN1(a), will receive some redistributed
load, with node a and its adjacent links being removed from the network. Given a node
u 2 N1(a), L1(a; u) denotes the redistributed load received by node u from node a at
step 1, where L1(a; u) is proportional to the capacity of u, and is given as
L1(a; u) , L1(a)
C(u)P
i2N1(a)C(i)
: (2.2)
The load of u at the beginning of step 2 can be obtained as L2(u) = L1(u) + L1(a; u).
This redistribution rule makes sense since nodes with larger capacities bear larger absolute
load margins. After redistributing the load of a, some nodes in N1(a) may fail and be
removed from the network, and redistribute their total loads to their functioning neighbors
at step t = 2 in a similar fashion. We define the steady state as the step when the failure
propagation stops in the network. Let Ft, t  1, denote the set of nodes fail during the
step t. The set of accumulated failed nodes by the end of step t is denoted by Tt, where
Tt = a + [ti=1Fi. We define the failure ratio ft at step t as jTtj divided by the network
size n, i.e., ft = jTtj=n, such that ft 2 [0; 1]. This paper uses the average value of the
failure ratio taken over all random realizations of the ER graph and all random single-node
attacks to quantify the extent of the damage caused by a single-node attack.
We define the collective degree for a set W  V as the summation of the degrees of
6
Figure 2.1: An illustration of neighbors of a set U and the load redistribution between two
sets. Reprinted from [11].
the nodes in W , given by k(W ) ,
P
v2W k(v). Similarly, the aggregate capacity and
load of set W at step t are defined as C(W ) ,
P
v2W C(v) and Lt(W ) ,
P
v2W Lt(v),
respectively. The load redistributed at step t from a set W to a disjoint set U is denoted
by Lt(W;U) ,
P
8v2W;8u2U Lt(v; u). The neighbor set union of set W at step t is
given by Nt(W ) , ([v2WNt(v)) nW . An example of the neighboring set and the load
redistribution between two sets are illustrated by Fig. 2.1. Utilizing these notations, we
can formally present the load redistribution rule at an arbitrary step t as follows. For
t = 1; 2;    , 8v 2 Ft 1, and 8u 2 Nt(v), we have
Lt(v; u) , Lt(v)
C(u)
C(Nt(v))
= Lt(v)
k(u)
k(Nt(v))
: (2.3)
2.3 Partition of Nodes
To visualize the step-by-step cascade of failures, this paper proposes a partition which
can be applied to the overall node set V . According to the partition, set V is divided into a
7
Figure 2.2: Partition example: V is divided into V0 = fag; V1 = fb1; b2; b3g; V2 =
fc1; c2; c3; c4g; V3 = fd1g. Reprinted from [11].
sequence of distinct subsets V0; V1; V2;    , where V0 = fag is the initially attacked node.
For d  1; Vd denotes the set of nodes whose shortest distance (number of hops) to a is d,
measured over the initial topology. Note that the minimum number of steps that it takes
a cascade to reach to Vd is d. In Fig. 2.2, we demonstrate such a partition, from which
the following relationship can be observed between Vd, d  0, and their original neighbor
sets:
Vd =
8>>>><>>>>:
fag d = 0
N0(Vd 1) d = 1
N0(Vd 1)nVd 2 d > 1
: (2.4)
These are important properties to be utilized in our analysis. Obtaining E[jVdj], the av-
erage size of Vd, will simplify the analysis in Section 3. The following lemma gives an
approximation of E[jVdj]; d  1, for random single-node attacks in ER random graph.
Lemma 2.3.1 Consider a random single-node attack applied toG(n; p). Let node a be the
attacked node, and node e be an arbitrary node in V nfag. Let Pd be the probability that
8
the shortest path from e to a has length d; PrfBdg be the probability that at least one path
from e directly through a node in V nfa [ eg to a has a length which is less than or equal
to d. Then E[jVdj]; d  1, the average size of Vd, is simply
E[jVdj] = (n  1)Pd;
where Pd; d  1, can be obtained recursively as
P1 = p;
P2 = (1  p)(1  (1  p2)n 2);
Pd = (1  p) PrfBdg  
d 1X
j=2
Pj; d > 2:
In the numerical calculation, we assume that PrfBdg; d > 2, can be approximated recur-
sively as
PrfBdg  1  ((1  p) + p  (1 
d 1X
j=1
Pj))
n 2:
The proof of Lemma 2.3.1, including the discussion of the approximation, is provided
in the appendix. To see the accuracy of the results in Lemma 2.3.1, some simulations
were conducted with different values of n and p. It can be found that Lemma 2.3.1 always
yields accurate approximations of E[jVdj]. One example is shown in Fig. 2.3, in which
the theoretic estimates were obtained from Lemma 2.3.1, and the simulation results were
averaged from 8; 000 random realizations of G(150; 0:05). We can see that the two curves
are almost overlapping, such that the approximations given in Lemma 2.3.1 are highly
accurate.
9
Figure 2.3: Comparison between the theoretic estimates and the simulation results of
E[jVdj] in G(150; 0:05). The theoretic estimates match the simulation results. Reprinted
from [11].
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3. ESTIMATION OF THE AVERAGE FAILURE RATIO
Recall that the failure ratio ft at step t is defined as the total casualties jTtj divided by
the network size n, i.e., ft = jTtj=n. We use failure ratio to quantify the damage caused
by the attack. However, since both the topology (ER random graph) and the location of
the initial attack are random, the failure ratio would be a random variable. Thus, we focus
on the average value of this random variable taken over all realizations of the random
topologies and random single-node attacks. In this section, we first state a few properties
that will be utilized in the analysis, and then provide a step-by-step estimate of the average
failure ratio. At the end, we verify the accuracy of our estimations via simulations.
3.1 Properties of Load-based Cascade Model
Here are a few preliminary results useful to quantify the average failure ratio. The
following lemma and corollary address the first step of load redistribution after the attack.
They are particularly useful in early assessment of the attack impacts.
Lemma 3.1.1 Consider an attack on an arbitrary node a in the network G(n; p). Also,
consider the partition in Section 2.3 applied to the network. After the load redistribution
at step 1, the nodes in V1 either all fail or all survive.
proof 1 When node a fails, each node u 2 V1 receives some additional load given by (2.3).
The initial load of u and its capacity are given as k(u) and k(u), respectively (see (2.1)
and the explanation above it). Dividing the total load of u after the redistribution by its
Reprinted from [11] “Load-Dependent Cascading Failures in Finite-Size Erdo¨s-Re´nyi Random Net-
works” by D. Lv and A. Eslami and S. Cui, 2017, Network Science and Engineering, IEEE Trans on (TNSE),
Volume 4, Page 129-139. Copyright 2017 by IEEE.
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capacity, we have
L1(u) + L1(a; u)
C(u)
=
k(u) + L1(a)
k(u)
k(V1)
k(u)
;
=
k(V1) + k(a)
k(V1)
; (3.1)
which is the same for all nodes in V1. Therefore, at the first step either all nodes in V1 fail
(i.e., L1(u)+L1(a;u)
C(u)
> 1) or all of them survive (i.e., L1(u)+L1(a;u)
C(u)
 1).
Corollary 3.1.1 Consider an attack on an arbitrary node a in the network G(n; p). If the
degree constraint
k(a) + k(V1) > k(V1) (3.2)
holds, all the nodes in V1 fail at step t = 1, i.e., F1 = V1. Otherwise, there are no failures
occurring at step t = 1 or later. In particular, when   2, the degree constraint of (3.2)
cannot be satisfied and there would be no cascade of failures.
proof 2 According to the proof of Lemma 3.1.1, for each node u 2 V1, the ratio of its load
to its capacity by the end of step 1 is given as k(V1)+k(a)
k(V1)
, which is the same for all the nodes
in V1. Thus, all the nodes in V1 become overloaded only if this ratio is greater than 1, i.e.,
k(a) + k(V1) > k(V1). However, the condition k(V1) <
k(a)
 1 cannot be satisfied when
  2 since the aggregate degree of the set V1, i.e., k(V1), is always greater than or equal
to the degree of the node a, k(a).
Lemma 3.1.1 and Corollary 3.1.1 are direct consequences of our assumptions that the
capacity of a node is proportional to its initial load and the load of a failed node is redis-
tributed to its neighbors according to their capacity. There are two important remarks as
follows.
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Remark 3.1.1 Lemma 3.1.1 and Corollary 3.1.1 hold for each realization of random topol-
ogy with an arbitrary single-node attack, not only on the average level.
Remark 3.1.2 If   1, there is no tolerance for any extra load from the initially attacked
node, and all the nodes will fail as a result of the attack. On the other hand, if   2,
Corollary 3.1.1 suggests that the failure would not go beyond the attacked node, resulting
in ft = 1=n for t  1. Hence, there is no uncertainty about the network reaction to a
random single-node attack when   1 or   2. In the rest of the paper, we will focus
on the network reaction with  2 (1; 2).
3.2 Step 1 of Cascade
In the sequel, we present a step-by-step estimate of the average failure ratio that is
obtained recursively. The following theorem gives such an estimate after the first step of
load redistribution, which will be used to later derive the failure ratio at future steps.
Theorem 3.2.1 Consider a random single-node attack applied to G(n; p). We assume the
conditional distribution of k(V1) given jV1j = x is approximately normal with mean  and
variance 2, where
 = x+ x(x  1)p+ (n  x  1)xp;
2 = (2x(x  1) + (n  x  1)x)p(1  p):
Then E[f1], i.e., the average failure ratio at step 1, can be approximated as
E[f1] 
1
n
 
1 +
n 1X
x=1
x 

n  1
x

px(1  p)n 1 x(
x
 1   

)
!
;
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where
 
n 1
x

= (n 1)!
x!(n x 1)! is the binomial coefficient, and () is the cumulative distribu-
tion function (CDF) for the standard normal distribution.
The proof of Theorem 3.2.1, including the justification of the assumption used in Theorem
3.2.1, is provided in the appendix.
3.3 Future Steps of Cascade
The following theorem provides an estimate for the average failure ratio after the first
step, whose proof can be found in the appendix. The assumptions and approximations of
Theorem 3.3.1 are justified in the proof.
Theorem 3.3.1 Consider a random single-node attack applied to G(n; p). We assume,
1. We only consider the failures propagating in the forward direction; i.e., at step t,
only the nodes in V n [t 1d=0 Vd are considered as potential nodes to fail.
2. The set Ft 1 is considered as a large virtual node that redistributes its load to its
alive neighbors at step t with the rule defined in (3).
3. n is large enough such that the variance of jV^tj is small and jV^tj can be approximated
by E[jV^tj].
4. E[jV^tj j jFt 1j = E[jFt 1j]] is applied to approximate E[jV^tj].
5. Given jV^tj = E[jV^tj], Lt(Ft 1) and (   1)L0(V^t) are independent and approxi-
mately normal. Lt(Ft 1) has conditional mean ~ = E[jTt 1j](n 1)p and unknown
conditional variance ~2. (   1)L0(V^t) has conditional mean ^ = (   1)(n  
1)E[jV^tj]p and conditional variance ^2 = (  1)2(n  1)E[jV^tj]p(1  p). ( ~ ^^ )
is applied as an approximation of PrfLt(Ft 1) > (  1)L0(V^t) j jV^tj = E[jV^tj]g.
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Then an estimate of the average failure ratio E[ft] for step t  2 is obtained recursively
as
E[ft]  1
n
(
~  ^
^
)E[jV^tj] + E[ft 1];
where
E[jV^tj] = (n 
t 1X
d=0
E[jVdj])  (1  (1  p)E[jFt 1j]);
E[jTt 1j] = nE[ft 1];
E[jFt 1j] = n(E[ft 1]  E[ft 2]);
E[jV0j] = 1 by definition and E[jVdj]; d  1 are given by Lemma 2.3.1.
Theorem 3.3.1 provides a recursive method to obtain an estimate of the average failure
ratio for all the steps after step 1. Approximations are made to derive the above theorem.
One of the approximations, the forward-propagation approximation, will be discussed in
the following subsection. Cascade after step 1 is a very complicated process, which in-
volves a large number of random variables. Obtaining an exact closed-form solution is
mathematically difficult and computationally complex. In contrast, this theorem takes a
computationally manageable expression and provides good accuracy in the same time,
which is a simple yet effective approach towards calculating the damage due to a cascade.
3.4 Forward-Propagation Approximation
In the previous analysis, we proposed a step-by-step approximation of the average
failure ratio in a cascade event. For mathematical tractability, the approximation only
counts the failures propagating in the forward direction, which we denote by “forward
propagation”. In other words, at each step t of the cascade, we only consider failures
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caused by Vt 1 in Vt. This excludes any failures due to the load redistribution within Vt 1,
and any failures in Vt 2 caused by Vt 1 (here denoted as “backward propagation”). Let
us explain why the impact of backward propagation is negligible. Recall that Lemma
3.1.1 states that, the nodes in V1 either all fail or all survive at the first step. Our analysis
along with numerical results asserts that this fact almost holds for the future steps as well.
That is, at each step t, either “almost” all the nodes in Vt die or “almost” all of them
survive. Our analysis in Section 4.1 (Theorem 4.1.2) shows that if V1 fails for a given
, then the chance of V2; V3;    failing in the forward failure propagation is quite high,
leaving almost no nodes to be failed in the backward propagation. This also results in a
threshold behavior in the average failure ratio with respect to the load margin. That is, the
average failure ratio stays close to either 0 or 1 for almost every value of the load margin
while changing from near 1 to near 0 over a very short interval of the load margin. This
phase transition is further illustrated by our numerical results in the next subsection and is
scrutinized in Section 4.
3.5 Numerical Validation
In the derivation of the step-by-step estimates for E[ft], several approximations were
applied to keep the results tractable. To verify the accuracy of our estimations, a compar-
ison of the estimated average failure ratios given by Theorems 3.2.1 and 3.3.1 against the
simulation results is shown in Fig. 3.1. Two topologies, G(100; 0:05) and G(400; 0:01),
have been adopted to compute the average failure ratios caused by random single-node
attacks. In the simulation results, the empirical average failure ratios were calculated
via 8; 000 ER random graph realizations, and 500 experiments with random single-node
attacks in each topology, following the load-based failure propagation model defined in
Section 2. Fig. 3.1 shows the comparisons at multiple steps of the cascade. The results
make it clear that despite several simplifying approximations, our estimates follow the true
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Figure 3.1: Comparison between the estimated average failure ratios and the simulation
results in G(100; 0:05) and G(400; 0:01) under random single-node attacks. Estimates for
step 1 were given by Theorem 3.2.1, and estimates for steps 2, 4 and 9 were given by
Theorem 3.3.1. Reprinted from [11].
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(simulated) values very closely. We examined networks of different sizes, and found that
the approximation accuracy is acceptable as long as n is reasonably large, e.g., n  20.
As seen in Fig. 3.1, a random single-node attack may still cause serious damages to the
network, particularly when  (load margin) is relatively small. Another important obser-
vation is the quick drop in the size of such damages as the load margin grows. Such a
phase transition phenomenon will be explored in Section 4.
As an illustration of the real-world networks, some simulations were conducted in a
Facebook network [9] with n = 233 total nodes and k(V ) = 6384 total degrees. The step-
by-step comparison between the average failure ratios in the Facebook network and in ER
random graph under random single-node attacks is shown in Fig. 3.2. The ER random
graph was generated with the same size n and connecting probability (p = 6384=n=(n  
1) = 0:129) as the Facebook network. In Fig. 3.2, the simulation results in the Facebook
network were obtained from 2; 000 experiments with random single-node attacks in the
given network, while the simulation results in ER random graph were obtained from 2; 000
realizations of ER random graph, and 200 experiments with random single-node attacks in
each topology.
Furthermore, a comparison between the theoretic estimations of the average failure ra-
tios and the simulation results in the Facebook network, both at steady state, under differ-
ent  values is shown in Fig. 3.3. The estimated values were calculated by Theorems 3.2.1
and 3.3.1 with setting n = 233; p = 0:129. The simulation results were obtained similarly
with Fig. 3.2 and the values were recorded at the steady state. Although the Facebook
network’s power law degree distribution is different from the ER random graph’s bino-
mial degree distribution, our model still provides a close trace of the average failure ratio.
This example indicates that our model not only makes an important contribution to generic
complex network analysis, but also can provide a basis reference for real-world networks.
This is because that our model captures the impact of a network’s average degree, which
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Figure 3.2: Step-by-step comparison between the average failure ratios in the Facebook
network and in ER random graphG(223; 0:129) under random single-node attacks. Two 
values were tested:  = 1:01 and  = 1:035. The average failure ratios in both ER random
graph and the Facebook network have similar trend and approximately equal values at the
steady state. Reprinted from [11].
plays an important role in a cascade of failures.
3.6 Discussion of Other Attack Methods
In the previous subsection, we have shown that the simulation results in ER random
graph under random single-node attacks, which validated the analysis. Here we present
a brief discussion on other attack methods, including random multiple-node attack and
targeted attack on the node with the largest degree, to gain more insight of the proposed
model and the analytical results. A comparison between the above two attack methods
and random single-node attack is shown in Fig. 3.4. Two different  values were tested:
 = 1:15 and  = 1:2. The simulation results were obtained from 2; 000 realizations
of ER graph G(100; 0:05), and 200 experiments with random single-node attacks in each
topology.
According to Fig. 3.4, the average failure ratios on the steady state are different under
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of the estimated average failure ratios against the simulation re-
sults in the Facebook network under different  values. The estimation results are given
by Theorems 3.2.1 and 3.3.1, which accurately capture the phase transition phenomenon
of the average failure ratio over . Reprinted from [11].
three attack methods. A random five-node attack is always more devastating than a random
single-node attack under both two  values. A targeted attack on the node with the largest
degree is more destructive than a random single-node attack when  = 1:15. In contrast,
when  = 1:2, a random single-node attack leads to more failures than a targeted attack on
the node with the largest degree. This is because that V1 becomes overloaded almost surely
with  ! 1. Thus, when a node with a larger degree is attacked, more failures will be
triggered. However, when  becomes larger, the random single-node attack brings more
failures. This is the result of Lemma 3.1.1, whereby failure condition (3.2) is less likely
to be satisfied when the initial-attacked node has a larger degree with a large . Besides,
it is shown that the failure propagation under these three attack methods reaches to steady
state at the almost same time. Therefore, our analysis results can be applied as an estimate
of steady state for these two attack methods.
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Figure 3.4: Step-by-step comparison of the average failure ratios under three attack meth-
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attack. A targeted single-node attack leads to more failures than a random single-node at-
tack with  = 1:15 but fewer failures than a random single-node attack with  = 1:2.
Reprinted from [11].
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4. PHASE TRANSITION OVER 
As we mentioned earlier, the average failure ratio decreases from near 1 to 1=n as 
varies over the interval (1; 2). Simulation results in Fig. 3.1, however, indicate a rapid
phase transition over a much smaller interval, denoted in this paper by the threshold in-
terval. In this section, we study this interval to further characterize the network reaction
to random single-node attacks. We first find a critical point in this interval at which the
failure ratio becomes very sensitive to the changes in . We then derive the lower and
upper bounds of the interval.
4.1 Critical Value of 
For each E[ft]; t  1, we define a critical value of  at which E[ft] takes the median
value of its variable range. As seen in Fig. 3.1, E[ft] undergoes rapid changes in the close
vicinity of such a critical value. Since
E[ft] =
1
n
E[j [td=1 Vdj]  Prfv fails j v 2 [td=1Vdg+
1
n
; (4.1)
where Prfv fails j v 2 [td=1Vdg has a range [0; 1], the variable range of E[ft] is
E[ft] 2

1
n
;
E[j [td=1 Vdj] + 1
n

: (4.2)
Reprinted from [11] “Load-Dependent Cascading Failures in Finite-Size Erdo¨s-Re´nyi Random Net-
works” by D. Lv and A. Eslami and S. Cui, 2017, Network Science and Engineering, IEEE Trans on (TNSE),
Volume 4, Page 129-139. Copyright 2017 by IEEE.
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According to (4.1), the critical value of  could be found whenPrfv fails j v 2 [td=1Vdg =
0:5. Let c;t denote the critical  at step t, which is formally defined as
c;t , arg

Prfv fails j v 2 [td=1Vdg =
1
2

; 8t  1: (4.3)
We start our analysis by finding c;1, i.e., the critical  forE[f1]. In the following, we drop
the index t for c;t, l;t and h;t, wherever it is clear from the text. The proof of Theorem
4.1.1, including the justification of the assumption is provided in the appendix.
Theorem 4.1.1 Consider a random single-node attack applied toG(n; p). Under the same
assumption of Theorem 1. The critical value of  for the first step, i.e., c;1, can be
obtained by
c;1  1 + 1
1 + (n  2)p:
Before deriving c;t for t  2, consider Fig. 4.1, which shows the average failure ratio
over G(100; 0:05) via simulations. The four curves shown are recorded at steps 1, 2, 3,
and 9 of the cascade. These curves suggest that the variations of c;t over different steps
are very small. In fact, in G(100; 0:05), c;t for t  1 can be numerically obtained as
1:17 0:05. The following set of analytical results shed light on the fact that the critical 
stays almost the same across different steps, suggesting that c;1 may very well be used to
approximate c;t, t  2.
Lemma 4.1.1 Consider a random single-node attack applied to G(n; p). At any arbitrary
step, the failure probability of any node or set of nodes is a non-increasing function of .
proof 3 This lemma is intuitive. If node e fails with  = , it also fails if  2 (1; ).
The same is true for the failures of sets of nodes. Corollary 4.1.1 can be proven similarly.
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Figure 4.1: Comparison of critical values of  at different steps. Reprinted from [11].
Corollary 4.1.1 Consider a random single-node attack applied to G(n; p). At any ar-
bitrary step of the failure propagation, the failure probabilities PrfV1 failsg, PrfV1 [
V2 failg;    ;Prf
S
d Vd failg are non-increasing functions of .
Notice that no assumptions are required for Lemma 4.1.1 and Corollary 4.1.1.
Theorem 4.1.2 Consider a random single-node attack applied toG(n; p)with  2 (1; 1
(n 2)p+
1], and define a family of events: Xt=“Vt fails at step t”, t  1. We assume that the set
Ft 1 can be considered as a large virtual node that redistributes its load to its alive neigh-
bors at step t. Then the conditional probabilities of failure satisfy PrfXt j Xt 1g 
PrfX1g;8t > 1.
The proof of Theorem 4.1.2, including the justifications of the assumptions used, is pro-
vided in the appendix. First note that Lemma 4.1.1 along with Theorem 4.1.1 indicates
that PrfV1 fails at step 1g  0:5 when  > c;1  11+(n 2)p + 1. Since any further
failures are conditioned on the failure of V1 in the first step, the failure probability of
any node at any step will be smaller than or equal to PrfV1 fails at step 1g  0:5 when
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 > c;1  11+(n 2)p + 1. This along with the definition of c;t implies that c;t for every
step t  2 is within the small range (1; c;1). Note that p = lnn=n is the threshold for
connectedness of G(n; p) [5]. Therefore, in a connected G(n; p), we have np  lnn,
which is greater than or equal to 3:22 in typical-size networks of 25 nodes or larger.
This leads to c;1 is approximate less or equal than 1:24 for connected networks that
are of interest in this paper. On the other hand, we can see from Fig. 4.1 that there ex-
ists an l > 1 (to be calculated in Section 4.2) such that PrfV1 fails at step 1g  1 for
 2 (1; l]. By applying Theorem 4.1.2 and the chain rule of probability, we obtain
Prf[td=1Vd failg  (PrfV1 fails at step 1g)t  1 for  2 (1; l]. Therefore, c;t sits
within a very narrow range of (l; c;1), enabling us to approximate c;t; t  2 by c;1
given in Theorem 4.1.1.
Numerical results are shown in Table 4.1 to quantify the accuracy of approximating
c;t; t  2 by c;1. Relative approximation errors are provided for various steps of cascade
over four different topologies: G(100; 0:03),G(100; 0:05),G(200; 0:03) andG(400; 0:01).
Under each topology, c;t; t = 1;    ; 9, are first manually obtained from simulations
according to the definition of c;t, and then compared against c;1 given by Theorem 4.1.1.
As we see, the approximation error in each case is less than 1%, suggesting that the simple
expression for c;1 given by Theorem 4.1.1 can be applied to approximate the critical value
of the tolerance parameter for almost every step.
Because that the close-form expression of c;1 given by Theorem 4.1.1 is simple and
only depend on np and p, not depend on n. This result can even be applied to the asymp-
totic case: n!1; np! . In such case, we have p! 0 and c ! 1 + 1=(1 + ). This
knowledge of c can be utilized as a fast prediction of the  region where the cascading
failures happen in a network.
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4.2 Threshold Interval [l; h]
As we discussed at the beginning of this section, E[ft] drops significantly from its
maximum value to near zero within a small interval, referred to as the threshold interval.
Based on the relationship between E[ft] and Prfv fails j v 2 [td=1Vdg given in (4.1), this
is the interval where Prfv fails j v 2 [td=1Vdg drops from near 1 to 1=n. We denote the
threshold interval at step t by [l;t; h;t]. With l;t and h;t, the domain of  at step t is
divided into three parts: (1; l;t); [l;t; h;t] and (h;t; 2). In particular, Prfv fails j v 2
[td=1Vdg stays very close to 1 for  2 (1; l;t), drops quickly for  2 [l;t; h;t], and stays
close to 0 for  2 (h;t; 2). In this section, we provide approximations for l;t and h;t
and verify their accuracy via simulations.
As a well-studied result, the normal random variable takes 95% and 99% of its values
within two and three standard deviations of its mean, respectively. This fact is known as
the empirical rule. Accordingly, we present two criteria for the threshold interval, namely
2 and 3 intervals, within which Prfv fails j v 2 [td=1Vdg loses 95% and 99% of its
maximum values, respectively. We start by presenting our method to approximate the
threshold interval for the first step of a cascade. The proof of Theorem 4.2.1, including the
justifications of the assumptions, is provided in the appendix.
Theorem 4.2.1 Consider a random single-node attack applied toG(n; p). Under the same
assumption of Theorem 1. We also assume h;1 and l;1 are estimated given jV1j = (n  
1)p. The threshold interval [l;1; h;1] for the first step of the cascade can be obtained as
follows:
h;1  1 + 1
 c
q
(p+ n 3
n 1)(1  p) + 1 + (n  2)p
;
l;1  1 + 1
c
q
(p+ n 3
n 1)(1  p) + 1 + (n  2)p
;
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Figure 4.2: Verification of c and threshold intervals for G(100; 0:03), G(100; 0:05),
G(200; 0:03), G(400; 0:01); E[f1], E[f2], E[f3], E[f4], E[fsteady state] were obtained from
cascading failure simulations; c and 2 interval, 3 interval were given by Theorem 4.1.1
and Theorem 4.2.1. Reprinted from [11].
where c = 2 and c = 3 lead to the 2 and 3 threshold intervals, respectively. Within the
2 and 3 threshold intervals, E[f1] drops 95% and 99% of its maximum value, respec-
tively.
In Section 4.1, we showed how c;t; t  2 is well approximated by c;1. Similarly, we
justify here how l;1 and h;1 above serve as good approximations of l;t and h;t, t  2.
Since all future failures are conditioned on the failure of the first step, we have Prfv fails j
v 2 [td=1Vdg  PrfV1 fails at step 1g, 8 2 (1; 2). Therefore, the definition of threshold
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interval yields
l;t  l;1; h;t  h;1: (4.4)
However, applying Theorem 4.1.2 and the chain rule of probability to the interval  2
(1; l;1], we have
Prfv fails j v 2 [td=1Vdg  Prf[td=1Vd failg
 (PrfV1 fails at step 1g)t;  2 (1; l;1]: (4.5)
Since PrfV1 fails at step 1g  1 when  2 (1; l;1], we obtain
Prfv fails j v 2 [td=1Vdg  1;  2 (1; l;1]
) l;t l;1: (4.6)
From (4.4) and (4.6) we conclude that l;t  l;1, 8t  2. On the other hand, we know
that h;t 2 (c;t; h;1], which is very narrow. Therefore, h;1 provides a tight upper bound
for h;t, which is often appreciated when designing a robust network. Here, we simply
approximate h;t by h;1 given in Theorem 4.2.1.
We now verify the accuracy of our findings for c and [l; h] by considering cascad-
ing failures over four different topologies: G(100; 0:03), G(100; 0:05), G(200; 0:03) and
G(400; 0:01). The exact values obtained by simulations are depicted in Fig. 4.2, along
with the analytical approximates given by Theorems 4.1.1 and 4.2.1. Simulation results
were obtained in the same method with Fig. 3.1. As it can be seen, c and [l; h] obtained
from Theorem 4.1.1 and Theorem 4.2.1 accurately characterize the phase transition in the
average failure ratio due to a random single-node attack. This knowledge of threshold in-
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terval can be utilized to avoid risky or redundant investment when the tolerance parameter
is set to operate the network.
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Table 4.1: True values of c;t for steps 1 through 9, their approximations by c;1 from
Theorem 4.1.1, and the approximation errors. Reprinted from [11].
n = 100; p = 0:03
Step t c;t c;1 by Theorem 3 Relative Error
1 1:2530
1:2538
0:0644%
2 1:2551 0:1030%
3 1:2521 0:1363%
4 1:2521 0:1363%
5 1:2551 0:1030%
6 1:2551 0:1030%
9 1:2551 0:1030%
n = 100; p = 0:05
Step t c;t c;1 by Theorem 3 Relative Error
1 1:1750
1:1695
0:4688%
2 1:1711 0:1373%
3 1:1711 0:1373%
4 1:1711 0:1373%
5 1:1741 0:3925%
6 1:1741 0:3925%
9 1:1741 0:3925%
n = 200; p = 0:03
Step t c;t c;1 by Theorem 3 Relative Error
1 1:1531
1:1441
0:7812%
2 1:1441 0%
3 1:1471 0:2622%
4 1:1471 0:2622%
5 1:1471 0:2622%
6 1:1471 0:2622%
9 1:1471 0:2622%
n = 400; p = 0:01
Step t c;t c;1 by Theorem 3 Relative Error
1 1:2000
1:2008
0:0669%
2 1:1991 0:1418%
3 1:1940 0:5999%
4 1:1933 0:6248%
5 1:1999 0:0752%
6 1:1200 0:0669%
9 1:1200 0:0669%
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5. CONCLUSION
We introduced a load-based cascade model to study the vulnerability of complex net-
works under random single-node attacks, where the ER random graph with finite size was
used to represent the network. We assumed that the capacity of a node is proportional to
its initial load and the load of a failed node is redistributed to its neighbors according to
their capacity. The average failure ratio at each step was used to quantify the damage ex-
perienced by the network. A step-by-step estimation of the average failure ratio has been
provided. The accuracy of such estimations was validated by numerical results. Our anal-
ysis for finite-size networks revealed a phase transition phenomenon in network reactions
to single-node attacks, where the average value of the failure ratio drops quickly within
a short interval of the load margin. We characterized this interval by finding the critical
value of the tolerance parameter at which the failure ratio takes its median value and is
most sensitive to the variation of the tolerance parameter. We also derived the threshold
interval within which this phase transition occurs. Our findings shed light on how to set
the load margin for both robustness and efficient use of resources in designing networks
resilient to random single-node attacks.
Reprinted from [11] “Load-Dependent Cascading Failures in Finite-Size Erdo¨s-Re´nyi Random Net-
works” by D. Lv and A. Eslami and S. Cui, 2017, Network Science and Engineering, IEEE Trans on (TNSE),
Volume 4, Page 129-139. Copyright 2017 by IEEE.
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APPENDIX A
SOME PROOFS FOR THEOREMS, COROLLARIES, LEMMAS
Lemma 2.3.1 Consider a random single-node attack applied to G(n; p). Let node a be
the attacked node, and node e be an arbitrary node in V nfag. Let Pd be the probability
that the shortest path from e to a has length d; PrfBdg be the probability that at least one
path from e directly through a node in V nfa [ eg to a has a length which is less than or
equal to d. Then E[jVdj]; d  1, the average size of Vd, is simply
E[jVdj] = (n  1)Pd;
where Pd; d  1, can be obtained recursively as
P1 = p;
P2 = (1  p)(1  (1  p2)n 2);
Pd = (1  p) PrfBdg  
d 1X
j=2
Pj; d > 2:
In the numerical calculation, we assume that PrfBdg; d > 2, can be approximated recur-
sively as
PrfBdg  1  ((1  p) + p  (1 
d 1X
j=1
Pj))
n 2:
proof 4 (Proof of Lemma 2.3.1) Suppose that we randomly pick a node a from the ER
graph G(n; p), where any two nodes are connected with probability p. For an arbitrary
node e 2 V na, we define a family of probabilities as Pd = Prfthe shortest path between
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nodes e and a has length dg, P[i;j] = Prfthe shortest path between nodes e and a has
length within [i; j]g, satisfying
P[i;j] =
jX
d=i
Pd; 0 < i  j:
Since Pd is the same for all the nodes in V na, the expectation of jVdj over all possible
topologies can be calculated as
E[jVdj] = (n  1)Pd: (5.1)
We use induction to obtain Pd. We first have P1 = p. When d  2, we find Pd as
Pd =
8><>: P[2;d] d = 2P[2;d]  Pd 1j=2 Pj d > 2 ; (5.2)
where P[2;d] remains to be found. The event “the shortest distance from e to a is within
[2; d]” is true if the following two independent events happen at the same time: A =“e is
not directly connected to a” and Bd =“at least one path from e directly through a node in
V nfa [ eg to a has a length which is less than or equal to d”. It can be easily seen that
PrfAg = 1  p. Then P[2;d]; d  2 can be obtained as
P[2;d] = PrfAgPrfBdg
PrfAg=1 p       ! = (1  p) PrfBdg: (5.3)
Now we aim to obtain PrfBdg; d  2. Given d = 2, node e can go through any node
in V nfa [ eg to a with probability p2. These (n   2) possible paths are independent. B2
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happens if any of these paths is connected. Therefore,
PrfB2g = 1  (1  p2)n 2: (5.4)
Combining (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4) we have
P2 = (1  p)(1  (1  p2)n 2): (5.5)
When d > 2, substituting (5.3) into (5.2), we have
Pd = (1  p) PrfBdg  
d 1X
j=2
Pj; d > 2: (5.6)
Combining P1 = p, (5.5) and (5.6) yields Lemma 1.
Now we aim to verify the approximation
PrfBdg  1  ((1  p) + p  (1 
d 1X
j=1
Pj))
n 2; d > 2: (5.7)
Since directly obtainingPrfBdg is complicated, we first focus on its complement Bd =“the
lengths of the (n 2) shortest paths from e directly through a node in V nfa[eg to a are all
greater than d”. Therefore, PrfBdg can be obtained through 1  Prf Bdg. Now our goal
is to approximate Prf Bdg. For notational simplicity, let l1;    ; ln 2 denote the lengths
of the (n   2) shortest paths from e directly through a node in V nfa [ eg to a, such that
Prf Bdg is the joint probability that l1;    ; ln 2 are greater than d, which can be expressed
as
Prf Bdg = Prf
n 2\
i=1
li > dg: (5.8)
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To obtain (5.8), we start from analyzing the joint probability that arbitrary two path
lengths from l1;    ; ln 2 are greater than d. Let us randomly pick two nodes v1; v2 2
V nfa [ eg and consider paths e ! v1 99K a and e ! v2 99K a, where “99K” stands for
the shortest path between the two nodes. Let l1 denote the length of e ! v1 99K a and
l2 denote the length of e ! v2 99K a. In ER random graph, e is connected to each node
independently with probability p. We can list the following three scenarios regarding the
connectivity between e and v1; v2:
1. e is not directly connected to v1, such that l1 =1. In this case, l1 and l2 will not be
affected by each other, such that they are independent.
2. e is not directly connected to v2. Similarly, l1 and l2 are independent.
3. e is directly connected to both v1 and v2. In this case l1 and l2 become dependent.
Let C1 =“Scenario 3): e is directly connected to both v1 and v2”. According to scenarios
1) and 2), we have l1 ? l2 j C1. Now we aim to calculate the joint probability Prfl1 >
d; l2 > dg. Given d > 2, Prfl1 > d; l2 > dg can be rewritten according to the law of total
probability:
Prfl1 > d; l2 > dg
= Prfl1 > d; l2 > d j C1gPrfC1g+
Prfl1 > d; l2 > d j C1gPrf C1g
= Prfl1 > d; l2 > d j C1gp2+
Prfl1 > d; l2 > d j C1g(1  p2)
l1?l2j C1     ! = Prfl1 > d; l2 > d j C1gp2+ (5.9)
Prfl1 > d j C1gPrfl2 > d j C1g(1  p2);
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where Prfl1 > d j C1g can be obtained by
Prfl1 > d j C1g = (Prfl1 > dg   Prfl1 > d j C1gPrfC1g)=Prf C1g
= (Prfl1 > dg   Prfl1 > d j C1gp2)=(1  p2): (5.10)
Similar to (5.10), we can obtain Prfl2 > d j C1g. Substituting them into (5.9), we obtain
Prfl1 > d; l2 > dg = Prfl1 > d; l2 > d j C1gp2+
(Prfl1 > dg   Prfl1 > d j C1gp2)
(Prfl2 > dg Prfl2 > d j C1gp2)=(1  p2);
When p20; cancel p2           ! Prfl1 > dgPrfl2 > dg: (5.11)
The approximation (5.11) holds when p2 is small, which is true under typical values
of p in networks of typical sizes, e.g., n  20. In addition, some simulations were con-
ducted to test the accuracy of approximation (5.11), and the results support our analysis.
The following steps describe how the simulations were conducted: in a network of size n,
arbitrarily four nodes a; e; v1, and v2 were selected. Then we counted l1 and l2 in 100; 000
realizations of ER random graph. Based on the numerical results of l1 and l2, we calcu-
lated Prfl1 > d; l2 > dg and Prfl1 > dgPrfl2 > dg. Under varied values of n, p and d,
these two probabilities are always approximately equal, which indicates the assumption is
valid even in small networks with relatively larger p, e.g., n = 20; p = 0:3. Partial results
are shown in Table 5.1.
Based on (5.11), we aim to extend the approximation to the joint probability Prf Bdg
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in (5.8). First we rewrite (5.11) as
Prfl1 > d; l2 > dg
= Prfl1 > d j l2 > dgPrfl2 > dg
 Prfl1 > dgPrfl2 > dg;
Since Prfl2>dg6=0; cancel Prfl2>dg on both sides                           !
Prfl1 > d j l2 > dg  Prfl1 > dg: (5.12)
Since an ER random graph is homogeneous network and each node has an identical
statistical property, result (5.12) also applies to other path lengths l1;    ; ln 2. In a
finite-size network G(n; p), according to the chain rule, the joint probability Prf Bdg =
PrfTn 2i=1 li > dg can be expanded as
Prf Bdg = Prf
n 2\
i=1
li > dg
=
n 2Y
i=1
Prfli > d j
i 1\
j=1
lj > dg;
(5.12)   !
n 2Y
i=1
Prfli > dg: (5.13)
In order to find (5.13), we need to have Prfli > dg; i = 1;    ; n  2. Assume l1 is the
length of the path through node v1, so l1 > d happens when either e is not connected to v1
(l1 = 1) or e is connected to v1 but the distance between v1 and a is greater than d   1.
Because ER random graph is a homogeneous network and l1;    ; ln 2 have the identical
statistical property, Prfli > dg; i = 1; 2;    ; n  2, can be obtained by
Prfli > dg = (1  p) + p  (1  P[1;d 1]): (5.14)
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Substituting (5.14) into (5.13), we have
Prf Bdg  ((1  p) + p  (1 
d 1X
j=1
Pj))
n 2; d > 2; (5.15)
Thus, the approximation in (5.7) is justified.
Table 5.1: Simulation results to test the dependence of two path lengths.
Network d Prfl1 > d; l2 > dg Prfl1 > dg  Prfl2 > dg
G(100; 0:05)
4 0:9287 0:9286
10 0:9054 0:9051
G(20; 0:3)
4 0:8265 0:8270
8 0:4926 0:4922
Theorem 3.2.1 Consider a random single-node attack applied to G(n; p). We assume
the conditional distribution of k(V1) given jV1j = x is approximately normal with mean 
and variance 2, where
 = x+ x(x  1)p+ (n  x  1)xp;
2 = (2x(x  1) + (n  x  1)x)p(1  p):
Then E[f1], i.e., the average failure ratio at step 1, can be approximated as
E[f1] 
1
n
 
1 +
n 1X
x=1
x 

n  1
x

px(1  p)n 1 x(
x
 1   

)
!
;
where
 
n 1
x

= (n 1)!
x!(n x 1)! is the binomial coefficient, and () is the cumulative distribu-
tion function (CDF) for the standard normal distribution.
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proof 5 (Proof of Theorem 3.2.1) Since E[f1] can be obtained as E[f1] = 1n(1 +E[jF1j]),
it is enough to find E[jF1j]. Based on Corollary 1, we have the failure condition for V1 as
k(V1) <
k(V0)
 1 . According to the failure condition, the distribution of jF1j can be expressed
as
PrfjF1j = xg
= Prfk(V1) < k(V0)
  1 j jV1j = xg  PrfjV1j = xg; (5.16)
and expectation of jF1j can be obtained by the law of total probability as
E[jF1j] =
n 1X
x=1
x  Prfk(V1) < k(V0)
  1 j jV1j = xg  PrfjV1j = xg; (5.17)
where jV1j is the number of nodes in V1, which obeys a binomial distribution. That is,
jV1j  B(n  1; p) and
PrfjV1j = xg =

n  1
x

px(1  p)n 1 x: (5.18)
Now to find (5.17), we need to calculate the conditional distribution of k(V1) given
jV1j = x. The links adjacent to nodes in V1 can be divided into three categories: edges
between V0 and V1, within V1, and between V1 and V2, denoted by the sets E(V0; V1), E(V1),
and E(V1; V2), respectively. Such partition of edges is illustrated in Fig. 5.1. We then have
k(V1) = jE(V0; V1)j+ 2jE(V1)j+ jE(V1; V2)j: (5.19)
Here we show k(V1) is approximately normal given jV1j = x; x 2 [1; n  1]. In (5.19), it
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Figure 5.1: Partition of edges within and adjacent to V1: E(V0; V1) = f1; 2; 3g; E(V1) =
f4g; E(V1; V2) = f5; 6; 7; 8g.
can be easily seen that jE(V0; V1)j = x, while jE(V1)j and jE(V1; V2)j depend on connec-
tivity of nodes. In a ER random graph, each pair of nodes are connected with a probability
p independent of other pairs [6]. Thus, jE(V1)j follows a binomial distribution B(
 
x
2

; p)
when x  2 and jE(V1)j = 0 when x = 1. jE(V1; V2)j follows a binomial distribution
B((n   x   1)x; p). Under typical settings, jE(V1)j is much smaller than jE(V1; V2)j.
For example, in G(100; 0:05), given jV1j = 5, we have E[jE(V1)j] = 0:25, whereas
E[jE(V1; V2)j] = 94  0:25. Therefore, 2jE(V1)j + jE(V1; V2)j  jE(V1)j + jE(V1; V2)j,
which followsB(1
2
x(x 1)+(n x 1)x; p). This binomial distribution is approximately
normal since (n   x   1)x  p and (n   x   1)x  (1   p) are both greater than 5 under
typical settings in networks with practical-sizes (We usually have np  lnn in a connected
graph G(n; p) [5]). Therefore, k(V1) is approximately normal given jV1j = x. Let  and
2 denote the conditional mean and variance of k(V1) given jV1j = x, respectively. They
can be obtained by
 = x+ x(x  1)p+ (n  x  1)xp;
2 = (2x(x  1) + (n  x  1)x)p(1  p):
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Such that Prfk(V1) < k(V0) 1 j jV1j = xg in (5.17) can be approximated as
Prfk(V1) < k(V0)
  1 j jV1j = xg  (
x
 1   

): (5.20)
After substituting (5.18) and (5.20) into (5.17), we obtain
E[jF1j] 
n 1X
x=1
x 

n  1
x

px(1  p)n 1 x(
x
 1   

):
By definition, E[f1] = 1n(1 + E[jF1j]), which yields Theorem 1.
Theorem 3.3.1 Consider a random single-node attack applied to G(n; p). We assume,
1. We only consider the failures propagating in the forward direction; i.e., at step t,
only the nodes in V n [t 1d=0 Vd are considered as potential nodes to fail.
2. The set Ft 1 is considered as a large virtual node that redistributes its load to its alive
neighbors at step t with the rule defined in (3).
3. n is large enough such that the variance of jV^tj is small and jV^tj can be approximated
by E[jV^tj].
4. E[jV^tj j jFt 1j = E[jFt 1j]] is applied to approximate E[jV^tj].
5. Given jV^tj = E[jV^tj], Lt(Ft 1) and ( 1)L0(V^t) are independent and approximately
normal. Lt(Ft 1) has conditional mean ~ = E[jTt 1j](n  1)p and unknown condi-
tional variance ~2. (  1)L0(V^t) has conditional mean ^ = (  1)(n  1)E[jV^tj]p
and conditional variance ^2 = (   1)2(n   1)E[jV^tj]p(1   p). ( ~ ^^ ) is applied
as an approximation of PrfLt(Ft 1) > (  1)L0(V^t) j jV^tj = E[jV^tj]g.
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Then an estimate of the average failure ratio E[ft] for step t  2 is obtained recursively as
E[ft]  1
n
(
~  ^
^
)E[jV^tj] + E[ft 1];
where
E[jV^tj] = (n 
t 1X
d=0
E[jVdj])  (1  (1  p)E[jFt 1j]);
E[jTt 1j] = nE[ft 1];
E[jFt 1j] = n(E[ft 1]  E[ft 2]);
E[jV0j] = 1 by definition and E[jVdj]; d  1 are given by Lemma 2.3.1.
proof 6 (Proof of Theorem 2) After step 1,E[ft] depends on random variables jV1j; jV2j;    ; jVt 1j,
as well as k(V1); k(V2);    ; k(Vt 1). However, finding the joint distribution of all these
random variables is very difficult. Therefore, we need to make several necessary sim-
plifying assumptions and approximations to obtain a closed-form result, as listed in the
theorem. In this proof, we will first use these assumptions and approximations to derive
the approximation of E[ft], and then justify all the assumptions and approximations point-
by-point in the end of the proof.
According to the assumption 1): we only consider the failures propagating in the for-
ward direction, i.e., at step t only the nodes in V n [t 1d=0 Vd are considered as potential
nodes to fail, we define the set of target nodes V^t at step t as the nodes in V n [t 1d=0 Vd con-
nected to Ft 1, as illustrated in Fig. 5.2. Since each node in V n [t 1d=0 Vd has probability
p to be connected with a node in Ft 1 independently, jV^tj obeys a binomial distribution
B(n Pt 1d=0 jVdj; 1  (1  p)jFt 1j). The target nodes will receive redistributed load from
Ft 1 at step t.
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Figure 5.2: At step t, Ft 1 redistributes its load to set V^t. Vt 1 is the set of nodes with a
shortest distance t  1 to node a; Ft 1 is the set of nodes failing at step t  1; V^t is the set
of target nodes at step t, defined as the nodes in V n [t 1d=0 Vd connected to Ft 1.
Furthermore, instead of analyzing the load redistribution for every node in Ft 1, we
make the assumption 2): the set Ft 1 is considered as a large virtual node that redistributes
its load to its alive neighbors at step t. This assumption makes the analysis mathematically
tractable. The problem now becomes “a single node redistributing its load to its neigh-
bors”. Similar to step 1, by applying Corollary 1 to this equivalent setting, the failure
condition for V^t can be found as
Lt(Ft 1) + L0(V^t) > L0(V^t); (5.21)
and E[jFtj] can be obtained as
E[jFtj] =
X
z
z Pr
n
V^t fails j jV^tj = z
o
PrfjV^tj = zg: (5.22)
Recall our goal is to obtain E[ft] through
E[ft] = E[jFtj]=n+ E[ft 1];
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where E[ft 1] is estimated in the previous step analysis. Now we aim to find E[jFtj] in
(5.22). However, it is difficult to find the exact distribution of jV^tj in (5.22) as it requires
the joint distribution of jV1j; jV2j;    ; jVt 1j and k(V1); k(V2);    ; k(Vt 1). According to
the approximation 3): E[jV^tj] is applied to approximate jV^tj, we have
E[jFtj]  Pr
n
V^t fails j jV^tj = E[jV^tj]
o
E[jV^tj]; (5.23)
where E[jV^tj] depends on random variable jFt 1j:
E[jV^tj] =
X
y
E[jV^tj j jFt 1j = y]  PrfjFt 1j = yg: (5.24)
And by V^t’s definition, we have
E[jV^tj j jFt 1j = y] = (n 
t 1X
d=0
E[jVdj])  (1  (1  p)y): (5.25)
Now we aim to find E[jV^tj]. To avoid finding PrfjFt 1j = yg and the summation in
(5.24), we make the approximation 4): E[jV^tj j jFt 1j = E[jFt 1j]] is applied to approxi-
mate E[jV^tj]. This approximation leads to
E[jV^tj]  (n 
t 1X
d=0
E[jVdj])  (1  (1  p)E[jFt 1j]); (5.26)
where
E[jFt 1j] = n(E[ft 1]);
andE[ft 1] is given by the previous step analysis;E[jV0j] = 1 by definition, andE[jVdj];8d 
1 are given by Lemma 1. We now estimate the probability Pr
n
V^t fails j jV^tj = E[jV^tj]
o
in (5.23). According to the failure condition (5.21), Pr
n
V^t fails j jV^tj = E[jV^tj]
o
can be
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obtained by
Pr
n
V^t fails j jV^tj = E[jV^tj]
o
= PrfLt(Ft) > (  1)L0(V^t) j jV^tj = E[jV^tj]g: (5.27)
According to assumption 5), the above probability can be approximated by
PrfLt(Ft) > (  1)L0(V^t) j jV^tj = E[jV^tj]g  ( ~  ^
^
); (5.28)
where
~ = E[jTt 1j](n  1)p;
^ = (  1)(n  1)E[jV^tj]p;
^2 = (  1)2(n  1)E[jV^tj]p(1  p):
By substituting (5.28) and (5.26) into (5.23), we find E[jFtj]. Then E[ft] can be ob-
tained as E[ft] = E[jFtj]=n+ E[ft 1], which yields Theorem 2.
Now we show the point-by-point justifications of all assumptions and approximations
used:
1. We only considered failures propagating in the forward direction, i.e., at step t, we
only considered the nodes in V n [t 1d=0 Vd as potential nodes to fail.
This assumption will be discussed in Section 3.4.
2. The set Ft 1 is considered as a large virtual node that redistributes its load to its
alive neighbors at step t with the rule defined in (3).
First, this assumption is necessary to make the load redistribution after step 1 math-
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Figure 5.3: Example of load redistribution. White numbers located inside of circles are
degrees, and numbers outside of circles are received load amounts.
ematically analyzable. Without this assumption, we would need to have the joint
distribution of all node degrees in Ft 1, as well as the link connections between
Ft 1 and V^t, which is analytically complicated, especially when t is large.
This assumption is appropriate in ER random graph because such graph is homo-
geneous by construction. In a typical realization of ER graph, the loads of nodes
in Ft 1 have small variation. After the nodes in Ft 1 distribute their loads to their
alive neighbors according to their degrees, a neighbor node with a higher degree
tends to receive more load, and vice versa. Such an example is shown in Fig. 5.3.
The given partial network is a typical realization of ER random graph. Nodes in
V1 redistribute their loads to their neighbors in V2. The scatter plot of the received
load amounts and degrees in V2 is also shown in Fig. 5.3. The linear correlation of
the received load amounts and degrees in V2 is 0:9556, indicating a strong linear
relationship, which matches the assumed case.
3. n is large enough such that the variance of jV^tj is small and jV^tj can be approximated
by E[jV^tj].
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By definition of target nodes, we have
jV^tj  B(n 
t 1X
d=0
jVdj; 1  (1  p)jFt 1j);
with variance
V ar = (n 
t 1X
d=0
jVdj)(1  (1  p)jFt 1j)(1  p)jFt 1j
= E[jV^tj]  (1  p)jFt 1j:
For t  2 and before the stage of steady state, we have jFt 1j  0, (1 p)jFt 1j  0
and V ar  0 under typical settings of finite networks. For example, given p = 0:06,
jFt 1j = 100 and E[jV^tj] = 40, V ar = 0:0822. With Chebyshev’s inequality, we
have PrfjjV^tj   40j > 3 
p
0:0822g  1
9
. We can see that jV^tj stays close to its
mean with high probability such that it can be approximated by its mean, as long as
network’ size is large enough (still finite). In addition, for the asymptotic case, we
also have (1  p)jFt 1j ! 0 and V ar ! 0 with jFt 1j ! 1.
4. E[jV^tj j jFt 1j = E[jFt 1j]] is applied to approximate E[jV^tj].
For notational simplicity, let Y = jFt 1j. Now our goal is to show that E[jV^tj] 
E[jV^tj j Y = E[Y ]]. According to (5.24), we have
E[jV^tj] =
X
y
E[jV^tj j Y = y]P (Y = y); (5.29)
where E[jV^tj j Y = y] can be rewritten as a function of y:
E[jV^tj j Y = y] = c(1  (1  p)y) := f(y); (5.30)
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Figure 5.4: Histogram of Lt(Ft 1) and fit normal distribution. Skewness and kurtosis
indicate that this distribution is quite symmetric, not heavily tailed.
with c = (n Pt 1d=0E[jVdj]) as a constant. Combining (5.29) with (5.30), we have
E[jV^tj] = E[f(Y )]: (5.31)
We now aim to show that E[f(Y )]  f(E[Y ]). First we look at the derivative of
f(y):
f 0(y) =  c(1  p)y ln(1  p);
where c is a positive constant, (1   p)y < 1, and ln(1   p)  0 under typical
settings in finite networks (where p is a small number). So f 0(y) is a very small
positive number. For example, given c = 10; p = 0:08, and y = 30, we have
f 0(y) =  10  0:9230  ln(0:92) = 0:0683, which is close to zero. Since f 0(y) is close
to zero and f(y) is approximately constant over y, E[f(Y )] can be approximated
by:
E[f(Y )]  f(y);
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where y is an arbitrary point within f(y)’s domain. Let us pick y = E[Y ] such
that we have E[f(Y )]  f(E[Y ]), where E[Y ] is obtained from the previous step
analysis. According to the simulation result, Y usually has a symmetric distribu-
tion and E[Y ] is the median of Y . Since f(Y ) is a monotonic increasing function,
f(E[Y ]) must be the median of f(Y ). Thus f(E[Y ]) is a reasonable approximation
of E[f(Y )]. Based on (5.31), we have
E[jV^tj] = E[f(Y )]  f(E[Y ]):
According to the definition of f(y) in (5.30), we have
E[jV^tj]  f(E[Y ]) = E[X j Y = E[Y ]]
= E[jV^tj j jFt 1j = E[jFt 1j]]:
5. Given jV^tj = E[jV^tj], Lt(Ft 1) and (   1)L0(V^t) are independent and approxi-
mately normal. Lt(Ft 1) has conditional mean ~ = E[jTt 1j](n 1)p and unknown
variance. (   1)L0(V^t) has conditional mean ^ = (   1)(n   1)E[jV^tj]p and
conditional variance ^2 = (  1)2(n  1)E[jV^tj]p(1  p). ( ~ ^^ ) is applied as an
approximation of PrfLt(Ft 1) > (  1)L0(V^t) j jV^tj = E[jV^tj]g.
For notational simplicity, letR1 andR2 denote random variables Lt(Ft 1) and ( 
1)L0(V^t), conditional on jV^tj = E[jV^tj]g, respectively. R1 has mean ~ and variance
~2. R2 has mean ^ and variance ^2. Thus, obtaining the probability PrfLt(Ft 1) >
(  1)L0(V^t) j jV^tj = E[jV^tj]g is equivalent to obtaining PrfR1 > R2g.
First we look at R1, which does not depend on jV^tj and it equals the summation
over the initial loads in Tt 1. Since all the nodes’ initial load amounts are i.i.d.
random variables with distribution B(n  1; p), we have R1  B((n  1)jTt 1j; p).
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However, jTt 1j is itself a random variable with an unknown distribution. Only
E[jTt 1j] is obtained from the previous step’s analysis. Thus, ~ = E[jTt 1j](n 1)p
is known, while ~2 and the distribution of R1 remain unknown. To get an idea of
what distributionR1 looks like, we show a histogram ofLt(Ft 1) from the simulation
results in Fig. 5.4, which has the following settings: n = 100; p = 0:06;  = 1:1; t =
4, and sample size is 50; 000. The case where no failures are triggered at step 1
was excluded in the histogram since no failures will happen at step 2 either in this
scenario. From Fig. 5.4, we see that R1 is approximately normal.
Then we look at R2. Given that jV^tj = E[jV^tj], we have R2  B((n  1)E[jV^tj]; p),
which is approximately normal because E[jV^tj]  0 before the steady state, such
that (n  1)E[jV^tj]p and (n  1)E[jV^tj](1  p) are both greater than 5 under typical
settings in a practical-size network. Given    1 is a constant, (   1)L0(V^0)
is also approximately normal. R2’s mean ^ and variance ^2 can be obtained as
^ = (  1)(n  1)E[jV^tj]p and ^2 = (  1)2(n  1)E[jV^tj]p(1  p).
Note R1 and R2 are independent because L0(V^t) and Lt(Ft 1) will not affect each
other’s distribution with given jV^tj. Then,
PrfR1 > R2g = PrfR2  R1 < 0g
 ( ~  ^p
~2 + ^2
); (5.32)
where ~2 remains unknown. We notice that PrfR1 > R2g does not depend on ~2 in
the following three cases:
(a) ~  ^ 0 and (5.32)  1,
(b) ~  ^ 0 and (5.32)  0,
(c) ~  ^ = 0 and (5.32) = 0:5.
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Recall the physical meaning of PrfR1 > R2g = Pr
n
V^t fails j jV^tj = E[jV^tj]
o
in
(5.27). The above cases a) and b) are dominant in a cascade since the threshold
behavior (to be discussed in Section 3.4 and Section 4.) subjects to either “almost”
all the nodes in V^t die or “almost” all of them survive. Therefore, we apply ( ~ ^^ )
to approximate ( ~ ^p
~2+^2
), which has a good accuracy in the above three case. The
accuracy of the above assumptions is further validated by Fig. 4.
Theorem 4.1.1 Consider a random single-node attack applied to G(n; p). Under the
same assumption of Theorem 1. The critical value of  for the first step, i.e., c;1, can be
obtained by
c;1  1 + 1
1 + (n  2)p:
proof 7 (Proof of Theorem 3) From Lemma 2, the nodes in V1 either all fail or all survive,
we have
Prfv fails j v 2 V1g = PrfV1 failsg:
Then finding  such that Prfv fails j v 2 V1g = 12 , i.e., c;1, is equivalent to finding 
such that PrfV1 failsg = 12 .
According to Corollary 1 and (5.20) in the proof of Theorem 1, PrfV1 failsg can be
approximated as
PrfV1 failsg 
n 1X
x=1

n  1
x

px(1  p)n 1 x(
x
 1   

); (5.33)
where  = x + x(x   1)p + (n   x   1)xp, 2 = (2x(x   1) + (n   x   1)x)p(1   p), 
n 1
x

= (n 1)!
x!(n x 1)! is the binomial coefficient, x = 1;    ; n 1 is the possible value of jV1j,
and () with is the CDF for the standard normal distribution. The approximation (5.33)
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was justified in the proof of Theorem 1. The summation
Pn 1
x=1
 
n 1
x

px(1   p)n 1 x in
(5.33) is 1, such that(x=( 1) 

) = 0:5 is sufficient to guarantee that PrfV1 failsg = 0:5.
(
x
 1   

) = 0:5;
, x
  1    = 0;
, x
  1   (x+ x(x  1)p+ (n  x  1)xp) = 0;
, 1
  1 = 1 + (x  1)p+ (n  x  1)p;
, 1
  1 = 1 + (n  2)p;
,  = 1
1 + (n  2)p + 1: (5.34)
We can see (5.34) does not depend on x, i.e., under any possible values of x,(x=( 1) 

) =
0:5 always holds when  = 1 + 1
1+(n 2)p . Substitute it to (5.33), we have PrfV1 failsg 
0:5. By definition, c;1  1 + 11+(n 2)p .
Theorem 4.1.2 Consider a random single-node attack applied to G(n; p) with  2
(1; 1
(n 2)p + 1], and define a family of events: Xt=“Vt fails at step t”, t  1. We assume
that the set Ft 1 can be considered as a large virtual node that redistributes its load to
its alive neighbors at step t. Then the conditional probabilities of failure satisfy PrfXt j
Xt 1g  PrfX1g;8t > 1.
proof 8 (Proof of Theorem 4) In ER random graph, the degree of each node has an inde-
pendent distribution. To simplify the proof, we first define four types of distributions.
1. Degree distribution of the initially attacked node a: LetE[k(a)] = 1 and V ar(k(a)) =
21 . From the previous analysis, we know that k(a)  B((n   1); p), which implies
1 = (n  1)p, and 21 = (n  1)p(1  p).
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2. Degree distribution of an arbitrary node e 2 Vd, d > 0: Let E[k(e)] = 2, and
V ar(k(e)) = 22 . We know e is connected to some nodes in the set Vd 1, such
that its minimum degree is 1. We have k(e)   1  B((n   2); p). This implies
2 = 1 + (n  2)p and 22 = (n  2)p(1  p).
3. Degree distribution of V1: Assuming E[k(V1)] = 3 and V ar[k(V1)] = 23 , we have
3 = EjV1j[
X
v2V1
E[k(v)]] = E[jV1j2]
= (n  1)p[1 + (n  2)p]; (5.35)
23 = EjV1j[
X
v2jV1j
V ar(k(v))] = E[jV1j22]
= (n  1)p(n  2)p(1  p): (5.36)
4. Degree distribution of neighbor set N(e), for arbitrary e 2 Vd; d > 0: By letting
E[k(e)] = 4 and V ar[k(e)] = 24 , we have
4 = EjN(e)j[
X
i2N(e)
E[k(i)]] = E[jN(e)j2]
= [1 + (n  2)p]2; (5.37)
24 = EjN(e)j[
X
m2jN(e)j
V ar(k(m))] = E[jN(e)j22]
= [1 + (n  2)p](n  2)p(1  p): (5.38)
Now, we use these four distributions to prove the theorem. According to Corollary 1,
the failure probability at the first step is
PrfX1g = Prfk(V0) + (1  )k(V1) > 0g: (5.39)
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For arbitrary t > 0, according to the assumption: the set Ft 1 is considered as a large
virtual node that redistributes its load to its alive neighbors at step t (justified in the proof
of Theorem 2), given Vt fails at step t, the failure condition for Vt+1 fails at step t+ 1 can
be found as
Lt(Vt) + L0(Vt+1) > L0(Vt+1);
which is equivalent to
tX
d=0
k(Vd) + k(Vt+1) > k(Vt+1):
Such that the conditional probability PrfXt+1 j Xtg can be obtained as
PrfXt+1 j Xtg;
=Prf
tX
d=0
k(Vd) + (1  )k(Vt+1)
> 0 j
t 1X
d=0
k(Vd) > (  1)k(Vt)g; (5.40)
Pt 1
d=0 k(Vd)>( 1)k(Vt)              !
>Prf(  1)k(Vt) + k(Vt) + (1  )k(Vt+1) > 0g; (5.41)
=Prfk(Vt) + (1  )k(Vt+1) > 0g; (5.42)
k(Vt+1)
P
m2Vt k(N(m));1                 !
Prf
X
m2Vt
k(m) + (1  )
X
m2Vt
k(N(m)) > 0g; (5.43)
=Prf
P
m2Vt k(m)
jVtj + (1  )
P
m2Vt k(N(m))
jVtj > 0g; (5.44)
>1  !
>Prf
P
m2Vt k(m)
jVtj + (1  )
P
m2Vt k(N(m))
jVtj > 0g: (5.45)
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Let  denote k(V0) + (1   )k(V1) in (5.39). Also, let 1 denote 
P
m2Vt k(m)
jVtj + (1  
)
P
m2Vt k(N(m))
jVtj in (5.44) and 2 denote
P
m2Vt k(m)
jVtj +(1 )
P
m2Vt k(N(m))
jVtj in (5.45). Our
goal is to obtain the  interval where (5.40) is equal to or greater than Prf > 0g. In
order to find this interval accurately, we look at both cases: Pr(1 > 0)  Pr( > 0)
and Pr(2 > 0)  Pr( > 0). Note that in the expressions of 1 and 2, for all m 2 Vt,
k(m) and k(N(m)) maintain distributions 2) and 4) defined in the beginning of this proof,
respectively. Assuming jVtj = b, we have
P
m2Vt k(m)
jVtj as the sample mean of b i.i.d. random
variables with the distribution 2) and
P
m2Vt k(N(m))
jVtj as the sample mean of b i.i.d. random
variables with distribution 4). Hence, the means of ; 1 and 2 satisfy
E[] = 1 + (1  )3
= (n  1)p+ (1  )(n  1)p[1 + (n  2)p]; (5.46)
E[1] = 2 + (1  )4
= [1 + (n  2)p] + (1  )[1 + (n  2)p]2; (5.47)
E[2] = 2 + (1  )4
= [1 + (n  2)p] + (1  )[1 + (n  2)p]2: (5.48)
The variances of ; 1 and 2 satisfy
V ar[] = 21 + (1  )223 = (n  1)p(1  p)+
(1  )2(n  1)p(n  2)p(1  p); (5.49)
V ar[1] = 
2
2
2
b
+ (1  )2
2
4
b
= 2
(n  2)p(1  p)
b
+
(1  )2 [1 + (n  2)p](n  2)p(1  p)
b
; (5.50)
58
V ar[2] =
22
b
+ (1  )2
2
4
b
=
(n  2)p(1  p)
b
+
(1  )2 [1 + (n  2)p](n  2)p(1  p)
b
: (5.51)
From these equations, we see that E[1] > E[2] > E[] and V ar(2) < V ar() for all
b.
Since ; 1; 2 are linear combinations of random degrees of multiple nodes, we apply
CLT to approximate their distribution with normal distributions. In order to find the 
interval satisfying PrfXt+1 j Xtg > Prf > 0g, we need to consider the following two
situations:
1. E[]  0 and E[1]  0 when Pr(1 > 0)  Pr( > 0),
2. E[2] > E[]  0 and V ar[2] < V ar() when Pr(2 > 0)  Pr( > 0).
In both situations, according to (5.40)-(5.45), we have PrfXt+1 j Xtg > Prf > 0g. Situ-
ation 1 leads to  2 [ 1
1+(n 2)p+1;
1
(n 2)p+1], and Situation 2 leads to  2 (1; 11+(n 2)p+1].
Putting the two situations together, we have PrfXt+1 j Xtg > PrfX1g when  2
(1; 1
(n 2)p + 1].
Theorem 4.2.1 Consider a random single-node attack applied to G(n; p). Under the
same assumption of Theorem 1. We also assume h;1 and l;1 are estimated given jV1j =
(n  1)p. The threshold interval [l;1; h;1] for the first step of the cascade can be obtained
as follows:
h;1  1 + 1
 c
q
(p+ n 3
n 1)(1  p) + 1 + (n  2)p
;
l;1  1 + 1
c
q
(p+ n 3
n 1)(1  p) + 1 + (n  2)p
;
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where c = 2 and c = 3 lead to the 2 and 3 threshold intervals, respectively. Within the
2 and 3 threshold intervals, E[f1] drops 95% and 99% of its maximum value, respec-
tively.
proof 9 (Proof of Theorem 5) According to the empirical rule for a normal distribution,
two and three standard deviations from the mean account for about 95% and 99% of the
probabilities, respectively. For readability, we rewrite (5.33) here:
PrfV1 failsg 
n 1X
x=1

n  1
x

px(1  p)n 1 x(
x
 1   

); (5.52)
where  = x + x(x   1)p + (n   x   1)xp, 2 = (2x(x   1) + (n   x   1)x)p(1   p),
x = 1;    ; n   1 is the possible value of jV1j. PrfV1 failsg is a weighted summation
of the standard normal CDF function (x=( 1) 

) over x = 1;    ; n   1. The normal
approximation in (5.52) was justified in the proof of Theorem 1.
Notice that the summation
Pn 1
x=1
 
n 1
x

px(1   p)n 1 x = 1 in (5.52). By definition of
threshold interval, l;1 is the  value such that (
x
 1 

) = c, and h;1 is the  value such
that (
x
 1 

) =  c, where c = 2 or c = 3, represents the 2 or 3 threshold interval,
respectively. First, we find the higher boundary h;1.
(
x
 1   

) =  c;
, x
  1    =  c;
, x
  1   (x+ x(x  1)p+ (n  x  1)xp)
=  c
p
(2x(x  1) + (n  x  1)x)p(1  p);
, 1
  1   (1 + (n  2)p) =  c
p
(1 + nx 1   3x 1)p(1  p); (5.53)
For notational simplicity, let  = 1 + (n   2)p and  = p(1 + nx 1   3x 1)p(1  p).
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Then, (5.53) leads to
h;1 = 1 +
1
 c +  : (5.54)
Similarly, the lower boundary l;1 can be obtained as
l;1 = 1 +
1
c + 
: (5.55)
In the above expressions,  depends on x. Our goal is to eliminate x from (5.54) and
(5.55), such that (5.52) would be a formula without the weighted sum over all x values.
Notice that the binomial distribution in (5.52) has a bounded two-side tail probabilitiesP2
x=1
 
n 1
x

px(1 p)n 1 x andPn 1x=3np  n 1x px(1 p)n 1 x [?], which are both negligible
in a connected ER graph with practical-sizes. So we focus on the domain x 2 [3; 3np].
First we show  > 4 (to be used later).
2   162
1 p<1    !>1 + (n  2)2p2 + 2(n  2)p  16(1 + 1
x
(n  3))p
x3  !1 + (n  2)2p2 + 2(n  2)p  16(1 + 1
3
(n  3))p
=1 + (n  2)2p2 + 2(n  2)p  16(2
3
+
1
3
(n  2))p
=1 + (n  2)2p2   10
3
(n  2)p  32
3
p
=((n  2)p  5
3
)2   16
9
  32
3
p; (5.56)
which is positive under typical settings (np > log n, p is small) in a connected ER graph,
such that  > 4.
To see how h;1 and l;1 changes with x, we first consider the partial derivative of h;1
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over x. According to (5.54), we have
j@h;1
@x
j
=
1
(   c)2  c
p
p(1  p)1
2
(1 + nx 1   3x 1)  12 (nx 2   3x 2)
=

(   c)2 
(n  3)x 1
1 + (n  3)x 1 
1
x
 c
2
: (5.57)
Here we show that j@h;1
@x
j is a very small under typical settings in networks with practical-
sizes. Assuming c = 3, we have (n 3)x
 1
1+(n 3)x 1 < 1,
1
x
 c
2
 1
2
and 
( c)2 <
1
4

(  3
4
)2
=
4

= 4
1+(n 2)p (since  <
1
4
), which is usually smaller than 1 under typical settings. Thus,
j@h;1
@x
j is usually smaller than 0:5. When c = 2, it can be shown that j@h;1
@x
j becomes even
smaller than the case when c = 3, using a similar method. For l;1, we have
j@l;1
@x
j = 
( + c)2
 (n  3)x
 1
1 + (n  3)x 1 
1
x
 c
2
; (5.58)
which is smaller than j@h;1
@x
j, since (+c)2 > ( c)2. For example, given n = 100; p =
0:05; x = 5; c = 2, we have j@h;1
@x
j = 0:0121 and j@l;1
@x
j = 0:003. Since @h;1
@x
and @l;1
@x
are always very small, i.e., h;1 and l;1 are approximately constant over x 2 [3; 3np], we
can eliminate x by replacing it with its mean E[jV1j] = (n   1)p (given by the proof of
Theorem 1). Substituting x = (n   1)p into (5.54) and (5.55), it leads to the estimates of
l;1 and h;1:
h;1  1 + 1
 c
q
(p+ n 3
n 1)(1  p) + 1 + (n  2)p
; (5.59)
l;1  1 + 1
c
q
(p+ n 3
n 1)(1  p) + 1 + (n  2)p
; (5.60)
where c can be 2 or 3 based on the 2 or 3 criteria, respectively.
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